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Abstract—We study bidding and pricing competition between
two spiteful mobile network operators (MNOs) with considering
their existing spectrum holdings. Given asymmetric-valued spec-
trum blocks are auctioned off to them via a first-price sealed-
bid auction, we investigate the interactions between two spiteful
MNOs and users as a three-stage dynamic game and characterize
the dynamic game’s equilibria. We show an asymmetric pricing
structure and different market share between two spiteful MNOs.
Perhaps counter-intuitively, our results show that the MNO who
acquires the less-valued spectrum block always lowers his service
price despite providing double-speed LTE service to users. We
also show that the MNO who acquires the high-valued spectrum
block, despite charing a higher price, still achieves more market
share than the other MNO. We further show that the competition
between two MNOs leads to some loss of their revenues. By
investigating a cross-over point at which the MNOs’ profits are
switched, it serves as the benchmark of practical auction designs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the exploding popularity of all things wireless,
the demand for wireless data traffic increases dramatically.
According to a Cisco report, global mobile data traffic will
increase 13-fold between 2012 and 2017 [1]. This dramatic
demand puts on pressure on mobile network operators (MNOs)
to purchase more spectrum. However, wireless spectrum is a
scarce resource for mobile services. Even if the continued
innovations in technological progress relax this constraint
as it provides more capacity and higher quality of service
(QoS), the shortage of spectrum is still the bottleneck when
the mobile telecommunications industry is moving toward
wireless broadband services [2].
To achieve a dominant position for future wireless services,
thus, it is significant how new spectrum is allocated to MNOs.
Since the spectrum is statically and infrequently allocated
to an MNO, there has been an ongoing fight over access
to the spectrum. In South Korea, for example, the Korea
Communications Commission (KCC) planed to auction off
additional spectrum in both 1.8 GHz and 2.6 GHz bands.
The main issue was whether Korea Telecom (KT) acquires the
contiguous spectrum block or not. Due to the KT’s existing
holding downlink 10 MHz in the 1.8 GHz band, it could
immediately double the existing Long Term Evolution (LTE)
network capacity in the 1.8 GHz band at little or no cost. This
is due to the support of the downlink up to 20 MHz contiguous
bandwidth by LTE Release 8/9. To the user side, there is no
need for upgrading their handsets. LTE Release 10 (LTE-A)
can support up to 100 MHz bandwidth but this requires the car-
rier aggregation (CA) technique, for which both infrastructure
and handsets should be upgraded. If KT leases the spectrum
block in the 1.8 GHz band, KT might achieve a dominant
position in the market. On the other hand, other MNOs expect
to make heavy investments as well as some deployment time
to double their existing LTE network capacities compared to
KT [3]. Thus, the other MNOs requested the government to
exclude KT from bidding on the contiguous spectrum block
to ensure market competitiveness. Although we consider the
example of South Korea, this interesting but challenging issue
on spectrum allocation is not limited to South Korea but to
most countries when asymmetric-valued spectrum blocks are
auctioned off to MNOs.
Spectrum auctions are widely used by governments to
allocate spectrum for wireless communications. Most of the
existing auction literatures assume that each bidder (i.e., an
MNO) only cares about his own profit: what spectrum block
he gets and how much he has to pay [4]. Given spectrum
constraints, however, there is some evidence that a bidder
considers not only to maximize his own profit in the event that
he wins the auction but to minimize the weighted difference of
his competitor’s profit and his own profit in the event that he
loses the auction [5]. This strategic concern can be interpreted
as a spite motive, which is the preference to make competitors
worse off. Since it might increase the MNO’s relative position
in the market, such concern has been observed in spectrum
auctions [6].
In this paper, we study bidding and pricing competition
between two competing/spiteful MNOs with considering their
existing spectrum holdings. Given that asymmetric-valued
spectrum blocks are auctioned off to them, we developed an
analytical framework to investigate the interactions between
two MNOs and users as a three-stage dynamic game. In
Stage I, two spiteful MNOs compete in a first-price sealed-
bid auction. Departing from the standard auction framework,
we address the bidding behavior of the spiteful MNO. In Stage
II, two competing MNOs optimally set their service prices to
maximize their revenues with the newly allocated spectrum. In
Stage III, users decide whether to stay in their current MNO
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or to switch to the other MNO for utility maximization.
Our results are summarized as follows:
• Asymmetric pricing structure: We show that two MNOs
announce different equilibrium prices to the users, even
providing the same quality in services to the users.
• Different market share: We show that the market share
leader, despite charging a higher price, still achieve more
market share.
• Impact of competition: We show that the competition
between two MNOs leads to some loss of their revenues.
• Cross-over point between two MNO’s profits: We show
that two MNOs’ profits are switched.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Related works
are discussed in Section II. The system model and three-stage
dynamic game are described in Section III. Using backward
induction, we analyze user responses and pricing competition
in Sections VI and V, and bidding competition in Section VI.
We conclude in Section VII together with some future research
directions.
II. RELATED WORK
In wireless communications, the competition among MNOs
have been addressed by many researchers [7]–[12]. Yu and
Kim [7] studied price dynamics among MNOs. They also
suggested a simple regulation that guarantees a Pareto optimal
equilibrium point to avoid instability and inefficiency. Niyato
and Hossain [8] proposed a pricing model among MNOs
providing different services to users. However, these works
did not consider the spectrum allocation issue. More closely
related to our paper are some recent works [9]–[12]. The paper
[9] studied bandwidth and price competition (i.e., Bertrand
competition) among MNOs. By taking into account MNOs’
heterogeneity in leasing costs and users’ heterogeneity in
transmission power and channel conditions, Duan et al. pre-
sented a comprehensive analytical study of MNOs’ spectrum
leasing and pricing strategies in [10]. In [11], a new allocation
scheme is suggested by jointly considering MNOs’ revenues
and social welfare. X. Feng et al. [12] suggested a truthful
double auction scheme for heterogeneous spectrum allocation.
None of the prior results considered MNOs’ existing spectrum
holdings even if the value of spectrum could be varied depend-
ing on MNOs’ existing spectrum holdings.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND GAME FORMULATION
We consider two MNOs (i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j) compete
in a first-price sealed-bid auction1, where two spectrum blocks
A and B are auctioned off to them as shown in Fig. 1. Note
that A and B are the same amount of spectrum (i.e., 10 MHz
spectrum block). Without loss of generality, we consider only
the downlink throughput the paper. Note that both MNOs
operate Frequency Division Duplex LTE (FDD LTE) in the
same area.
1It is a form of auction where two MNOs submit one bid in a concealed
fashion. The MNO with the highest bid wins and pays his bid for the spectrum
block.
Fig. 1. System model for spectrum auction. Without loss of generality, we
consider only the downlink throughput the paper.
Fig. 2. Three stages of the dynamic game.
Due to the MNOs’ existing spectrum holdings (i.e., each
MNO secures 10 MHz downlink spectrum in the 1.8 GHz
band), the MNOs put values on spectrum blocks A and B
asymmetrically. If MNO i leases A, twice (2x) improvements
in capacity over his existing LTE network capacity are directly
supported to users. In Third Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP) LTE Release 8/9, LTE carriers can support a maximum
bandwidth of 20 MHz for both in uplink and downlink, thereby
allowing for MNO i to provide double-speed LTE service
to users without making many changes to the physical layer
structure of LTE systems [13]. On the other hand, MNO j who
leases B should make a huge investment to double the capacity
after some deployment time T1. Without loss of generality, we
assume that MNO i leases A.
To illustrate user responses, we define the following terms
as follows.
Definition 1. (Asymmetric phase) Assume that MNO j
launches double-speed LTE service at time T1. When 0 ≤ t ≤
T1, we call this period asymmetric phase due to the different
services provided by MNOs i and j.
Definition 2. (Symmetric phase) Assume that T2 denotes the
expiration time for the MNOs’ new spectrum rights. When
T1 < t ≤ T2, we call this period symmetric phase because of
the same services offered by MNOs i and j.
We investigate the interactions between two MNOs and
users as a three-stage dynamic game as shown in Fig. 2. In
Stage I, two spiteful MNOs compete in a first-price sealed-
bid auction where asymmetric-valued spectrum blocks A and
B are auctioned off to them. The objective of each MNO
is maximizing his own profit when A is assigned to him, as
well as minimizing the weighted difference of his competitor’s
profit and his own profit when B is allocated to him. In Stage
II, two competing MNOs optimally announce their service
prices to maximize their revenues given the result of Stage I.
The analysis is divided into two phases: asymmetric phase and
symmetric phase. In Stage III, users determine whether to stay
in their current MNO or to switch to the new MNO for utility
maximization. To predict the effect of spectrum allocation, we
solve this three-stage dynamic game by applying the concept
of backward induction, from Stage III to Stage I.
IV. USER RESPONSES AND PRICING COMPETITION
IN ASYMMETRIC PHASE
A. User Responses in Stage III in Asymmetric Phase
Each user subscribes to one of the MNOs based on his
or her MNO preference. Let us assume that MNOs i and j
provide same quality in services to the users so they have the
same reserve utility uo before spectrum auction. Each MNO
initially has 50% market share and the total user population
is normalized to 1.
In asymmetric phase, the users in MNOs i and j obtain
different utilities, i.e.,
ui(t) = (1 + η)uo, uj(t) = uo, 0 ≤ t ≤ T1. (1)
where η ∈ (0, 1) is a user sensitivity parameter to the double-
speed LTE service than existing one. It means that users care
more about the data rate as η increases. The users in MNO j
have more incentive to switch to MNO i as η increases. When
they decide to change MNO i, however, they face switching
costs, the disutility that a user experiences from switching
MNOs. In the case of higher switching costs, the users in
MNO j have less incentive to switch. The switching cost varies
among users and discounts over time. To model such users’
time-dependent heterogeneity, we assume that the switching
cost is heterogeneous across users and uniformly distributed
in the interval [0, e−λt] at t ≥ 0, where λ denotes the discount
rate [15]. This is due to the fact that the pays for the penalty
of terminating contract with operators decrease as time passes.
Now let us focus on how users churn in asymmetric phase.
A user k in MNO j, with switching cost, sk(t), observes the
prices charged by MNOs i and j (pi(t) and pj(t)). A user k
in MNO j will switch to MNO i if and only if
uj(t)− pj(t) ≤ ui(t)− pi(t)− sk(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T1. (2)
Thus the mass of switching users from MNO j to i is
Qj→i(t)=
1
2
∫ ηuo+pj(t)−pi(t)
0
eλtds=
eλt (ηuo+pj(t)−pi(t))
2
,
(3)
where s is a uniform (0, 1) random variable and 12 denotes the
initial market share.
Since the market size is normalized to one, each MNO’s
market share in asymmetric phase is as follows:
Qi(t)=
1
2
+Qj→i(t), Qj(t)=
1
2
−Qj→i(t). (4)
B. Pricing Competition in Stage II in Asymmetric Phase
Given users’ responses (4), MNOs i and j set their service
prices p∗i (t) and p
∗
j (t) to maximize their revenues, respectively,
i.e.,
p∗i (t)=arg max
pi(t)
pi(t)Qi(t), i, j∈{1, 2} and i 6=j. (5)
The Nash equilibrium in this pricing game is described in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. When 0≤t≤T1 and ηuo<e−λt, there exists a
unique Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
p∗i (t)=e
−λt+
1
3
ηuo, p
∗
j (t)=e
−λt− 1
3
ηuo. (6)
Proof. In asymmetric phase, two competing MNOs try to
maximize their revenues ri(t) and rj(t), respectively, given
users’ responses, i.e.,
max
pi(t)
ri(t)=pi(t)Qi(t), i, j∈{1, 2} and i 6=j.
A Nash equilibrium exists by satisfying and solving the
following first order conditions with respect to pi(t) and pj(t),
i.e.,
∂ri(t)
∂pi(t)
=
1+(ηuo+pj(t)−2pi(t)) eλt
2
=0,
∂rj(t)
∂pj(t)
=
1−(ηuo−pi(t)+2pj(t)) eλt
2
=0.

Proposition 1 shows two MNOs’ equilibrium prices in
asymmetric phase. Intuitively, p∗i (t) increases as η increases.
With larger η, users care more about the data rate. Thus,
MNO i increases his service price to obtain more revenue.
On the other hand, p∗j (t) decreases as η increases. It means
that MNO j tries to sustain the revenue margin by lowering
the service price and holding onto market share. An interesting
observation is that both MNOs decrease their service prices
as t increases. Due to the discount factor (λ), the users in
MNO j are not locked-in and tries to maximize their utilities
by churning to MNO i as switching costs decrease over time.
Therefore, MNO i lowers his service price to maximize his
revenue, which forces MNO j to decrease the service price.
This phenomenon is consistent with the previous results [7],
[15] in that the reduction of switching costs intensifies the
price-down competition between two MNOs. If ηuo>e−λt,
then all users in MNO j churn to MNO i. However, it is an
unrealistic feature of the mobile telecommunication industry
so we add the constraint ηuo<e−λt.
Next we will show how each MNO’s market share changes
in asymmetric phase. Inserting the equilibrium prices (6) into
(4), each MNO’s market share can be calculated as follows:
Qi(t)=
3+ηuoe
λt
6
, Qj(t)=
3−ηuoeλt
6
, 0≤t≤T1. (7)
Intuitively, MNO i takes MNO j’s market share more as t
increases or η increases. To hold onto or take MNO i’s market
share, the time to launch double-speed LTE service T1 is of
great importance to MNO j.
When MNO j launches double-speed LTE service at time
T1, each MNO’s total revenue in asymmetric phase is given
by
ri(T1)=
∫ T1
0
ri(t)dt=
1−e−λT1
2λ
−1−e
λT1
18λ
(ηu0)
2
+
1
3
ηu0T1,
rj(T1)=
∫ T1
0
rj(t)dt=
1−e−λT1
2λ
−1−e
λT1
18λ
(ηu0)
2−1
3
ηu0T1.
(8)
Similar to the analysis of market share, Equation (8) shows that
MNO j should launch double-speed LTE service as quickly
as possible to narrow the revenue gap between MNO i and
MNO j (see the last term of the revenues (8)).
V. USER RESPONSES AND PRICING COMPETITION
IN SYMMETRIC PHASE
A. User Responses in Stage III in Symmetric Phase
Since MNO j launches double-speed LTE service in sym-
metric phase, we assume that the users in MNOs i and j obtain
same utility, i.e.,
ui(t)=uj(t)=(1+η)uo, T1<t≤T2. (9)
For better understanding of user responses in symmetric
phase, we first discuss the effect of switching costs on market
competition. Given the same services offered by two MNOs,
an MNO’s current market share plays an important role in
determining its price strategy. Each MNO faces a trade-off
between a low price to increase market share, and a high price
to harvest profits by exploiting users’ switching costs. The
following Lemma examines this trade-off and characterizes
each MNO’s price strategy, which is directly related to user
responses in symmetric phase.
Lemma 1. In a competitive market with switching costs, the
market share leader (i.e., MNO i) charges a high price to
exploit its current locked-in users while the marker share
followers (i.e., MNO j) charge low prices to increase market
share for revenue maximization, respectively, given the same
services offered by them.
Proof. We prove Lemma 1 by contradiction. Suppose that
MNO j charges a higher price than MNO i (i.e., pi(t)<
pj(t), T1<t≤T2). The mass of switching users from MNO
j to i is
Qj→i(t)=Qj(T1)
∫ pj(t)−pi(t)
0
eλtds=(pj(t)−pi(t))Qj(T1)eλt,
(10)
where Qj(T1)= 3−ηuoe
λT1
6 is the market share of MNO j at
the end of asymmetric phase. Then, each MNO’s market share
is given by
Qi(t)=Qi(T1)−(pj(t)−pi(t))Qj(T1)eλt,
Qj(t)=Qj(T1)
(
1−(pj(t)−pi(t))eλt
)
, (11)
where Qi(T1)= 3+ηuoe
λT1
6 is the market share of MNO i at
the end of asymmetric phase. Following the same steps of the
Proposition 1, we can find the Nash equilibrium by satisfying
and solving the following first order conditions with respect
to pi(t) and pj(t), i.e.,
∂ri(t)
∂pi(t)
=Qi(T1)+(pj(t)−2pi(t))Qj(T1)eλt=0,
∂rj(t)
∂pj(t)
=Qj(T1)
[
1−(2pj(t)−pi(t))eλt
]
=0,
which yields the solution given as follows
p∗1(t)=
(
9+ηu0e
λT1
9−3ηu0eλT1
)
e−λt,p∗j (t)=
(
9−ηu0eλT1
9−3ηu0eλT1
)
e−λt.
(12)
Thus, this contradicts to our assumption, completing the proof.

With Lemma 1, let us illustrate the process of user churn
in symmetric phase. The mass of switching users from MNO
i to j is
Qi→j(t)=Q1(T1)
∫ pi(t)−pj(t)
0
eλtds=(pi(t)−pj(t))Qi(T1)eλt,
(13)
where Qi(T1)= 3+ηuoe
λT1
6 is the market share of MNO i at
the end of asymmetric phase. Then each MNO’s market share
in symmetric phase is given by
Qi(t)=Qi(T1)
(
1−(pi(t)−pj(t))eλt
)
,
Qj(t)=Qj(T1)+Qi(T1)(pi(t)−pj(t))eλt, (14)
where Qj(T1)= 3−ηuoe
λT1
6 is the market share of MNO j at
the end of asymmetric phase.
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Fig. 3. MNOs’ equilibrium prices in asymmetric and symmetric phase under
two different user sensitivities (η=0.3, η=0.6). Other parameters are uo=1,
λ=0.01, T1=1, and T2=10.
B. Pricing Competition in Symmetric Phase in Stage II
As noted in Lemma 1, MNO j charges a lower price than
MNO i in symmetric phase. Following the same procedure (5),
the Nash equilibrium is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. When T1<t≤T2, there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium, i.e.,
p∗i (t)=
(
9+ηu0e
λT1
9+3ηu0eλT1
)
e−λt,p∗j (t)=
(
9−ηu0eλT1
9+3ηu0eλT1
)
e−λt.
(15)
Proof. Following the same steps of the Proposition 1, a Nash
equilibrium exists by satisfying and solving the following first
order conditions with respect to pi(t) and pj(t), i.e.,
∂ri(t)
∂pi(t)
=Qi(T1)
[
1−(2pi(t)−pj(t))eλt
]
=0,
∂rj(t)
∂pj(t)
=Qj(T1)−(2pj(t)−pi(t))Qi(T1)eλt=0.

Proposition 2 states the MNOs’ equilibrium prices in
symmetric phase. As described in Lemma 1, MNO i, the
market share leader announces a higher service price up to
2ηuoe
λT1
9+3ηuoeλT1
e−λt than MNO j.
To further investigate the effect of competition under the
same quality in services, let us calculate each MNO’s falling
price level in the neighborhood of the point T1. From (6) and
(15), each MNO’s falling price level (i.e., ϕi(T1) and ϕj(T1))
is
ϕi(T1)=lim
ε→0
(p∗i (T1−ε)−p∗i (T1+ε))=
ηu0
(
5+ηu0e
λT1
)
9+3ηu0eλT1
,
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Fig. 4. User responses in asymmetric and symmetric phase under two
different user sensitivities (η=0.3, η=0.6). Other parameters are uo=1,
λ=0.01, T1=1 and T2=10.
ϕ2(T1)=lim
ε→0
(
p∗j (T1−ε)−p∗j (T1+ε)
)
=
ηu0
(
1−ηu0eλT1
)
9+3ηu0eλT1
.(16)
Because 0<ηuo<e−λT1 , MNOs i and j always decrease their
prices up to ϕi(T1) and ϕj(T1) at the starting point of the
symmetric phase, respectively. Perhaps counter-intuitively, it
shows that MNO j always lowers his price despite launching
double-speed LTE service at the starting point of the sym-
metric phase. It can be interpreted as follows. Since MNO j
loses his market share in asymmetric phase, MNO j attempts
to maximize his revenue by lowering his service price and
increasing his market share, which forces MNO i to drop the
service price at the same time. This means that the MNOs’
competition under the same quality in services lead to some
loss of their revenues, which, known as a price war, is
consistent with our previous work [7]. Fig. 3 shows p∗i (t) and
p∗j (t) as a function of t under two different user sensitivities
(η=0.3, η=0.6). Note that MNO i’s falling price level is more
sensitive to η.
Next we show that how each MNO’s market share varies
in symmetric phase. From (14) and (15), each MNO’s market
share is
Qi(t)=
1
2
+
ηu0e
λT1
18
,Qj(t)=
1
2
−ηu0e
λT1
18
, T1<t≤T2. (17)
Unlike the asymmetric phase, each MNO’s market share only
depends on the deployment time of carrier aggregation T1
in symmetric phase. An interesting observation is that the
market share leader (i.e., MNO i), despite charging a higher
price, still achieves more market share up to 19ηu0e
λT1 than
MNO j. In terms of market share, MNO i always gains a
competitive advantage over MNO j if MNO j was forced to
lease less-valued spectrum block. This explains how critical
new spectrum is allocated to the MNOs, and how struggling
they are over access to the spectrum for improving market
competitiveness for future wireless services. Fig. 4 shows
user responses as a function of t under two different user
sensitivities (η=0.3, η=0.6).
If the new spectrum rights expire at t=T2, each MNO’s
total revenue in symmetric phase is
ri(T1,T2)=
∫ T2
T1
ri(t)dt=
(
9+ηu0e
λT1
)2
54(3+ηu0eλT1)
(
e−λT1−e−λT2
λ
)
,
rj(T1,T2)=
∫ T2
T1
rj(t)dt=
(
9−ηu0eλT1
)2
54(3+ηu0eλT1)
(
e−λT1−e−λT2
λ
)
.
(18)
Using (8) and (18), we examine the two MNOs’ aggregate
revenues when MNO i leases A and MNO j leases B. Each
MNO’s aggregate revenue at t=T2 is given in (19).
When MNO j decides to launch double-speed LTE service,
the optimal deployment time of the carrier aggregation T ∗1
should be studied. The following Lemma describes the MNO
j’s optimal deployment time.
Lemma 2. The market share followers (i.e., MNO j) should
launch double-speed LTE service as quickly as possible not
only for maximizing their own revenues but also for minimizing
the market leader’s revenue.
Proof. By taking the derivative of the two MNO’s aggregate
revenues rA(T1,T2) and rB(T1,T2) with respect to T1, respec-
tively, it can be checked that ∂r
A(T1,T2)
∂T1
>0 and ∂r
B(T1,T2)
∂T1
<0.
We omit the details of the derivations here. 
Lemma 2 states that the revenue of MNO j is strictly
decreasing over T1 while the reverse is for MNO i. To gain
more insight into the effect of the allocation of asymmetric-
valued spectrum blocks, let us define the revenue gain as
follows:
rgain=
rA(T1,T2)
rB(T1,T2)
. (20)
Fig. 5 shows the revenue gain as a function of η under two
different deployment times (T1=1, T1=2). As expected, the
revenue gain is strictly increasing over T1 and η. In terms of
η, it can be checked directly by following the same steps of
the Lemma 2. Such result explains why each MNO should
spitefully bid in a first-price sealed-bid auction to achieve a
dominant position or compensate the revenue gap, which we
will discuss these points in the next section.
VI. BIDDING COMPETITION IN STAGE I
In Stage I, two spiteful MNOs i and j compete in a first-
price sealed-bid auction where asymmetric-valued spectrum
blocks A and B are auctioned off to them. For fair compe-
tition, each MNO is constrained to lease only one spectrum
block (i.e., A or B). We assume that the governments set the
reserve prices cA and cB to A and B, respectively. Note that
the reserve price is the minimum price to get the spectrum
block. Since A is the high-valued spectrum block, we further
assume that two spiteful MNOs are only competing on A
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Fig. 5. Revenue gain as a function of η under two different times (T1=1,
T1=2). Other parameters are uo=1, λ=0.01 and T2=10.
to enjoy a dominant position in the market. MNOs i and j
bid A independently as bi and bj , respectively. In this case,
B is assigned to the MNO who loses in the auction as the
reserve price cB . Because the MNO who leases B should
make huge investments to double the existing LTE network
capacity compared to the other MNO, we also assume the
only MNO who leases B incurs the investment cost cBS .
When asymmetric-valued spectrum blocks are allocated to
the MNOs, there is a trade-off between self-interest and spite.
To illustrate this trade-off, we first restrict ourselves to the
case where spite is not present. If MNO i is self-interested,
his objective function is as follows.
Πi(bi,bj)=
[
rA(T1,T2)−bi
]·Ibi>bj+piB(T1,T2)·Ibi<bj , (21)
where I is the indicator function and piB(T1,T2)=
rB(T1,T2)−cB−cBS is the profit when leasing B. This case
is the standard auction framework in that MNO i maximizes
his own profit without considering the other MNO’s profit.
In the real world, however, there is some evidence that some
MNOs are completely malicious. The German third generation
(3G) spectrum license auction in 2000 is a good example
[16]. German Telekom kept raising his bid to prevent his
competitors from leasing spectrum. If MNO i is completely
malicious, his objective function can be changed as follows.
Πi(bi,bj)=
[
rA(T1,T2)−bi
]·Ibi>bj−[rA(T1,T2)−bj]·Ibi<bj . (22)
It means that MNO i gets disutility as much as the profit of
MNO j when he loses the auction. The minus term in (22)
implies this factor.
To reflect this strategic concern, our model departs from
the standard auction framework in that each spiteful MNO
concerns about maximizing his own profit when he leases
A, as well as minimizing the weighted difference of his
competitor’s profit and his own profit when he leases B.
Combining (21) and (22), we define each MNO’s objective
function as follows.
rA(T1,T2)=ri(T1)+ri(T1,T2)=
1−e−λT1
2λ
−
(
1−eλT1
18λ
)
(ηu0)
2
+
1
3
ηu0T1+
(
9+ηu0e
λT1
)2
54(3+ηu0eλT1)
(
e−λT1−e−λT2
λ
)
,
rB(T1,T2)=rj(T1)+rj(T1,T2)=
1−e−λT1
2λ
−
(
1−eλT1
18λ
)
(ηu0)
2−1
3
ηu0T1+
(
9−ηu0eλT1
)2
54(3+ηu0eλT1)
(
e−λT1−e−λT2
λ
)
. (19)
Definition 3. Assume that two spiteful MNOs (i.e., i,j∈{1,2}
and i6=j) compete in a first-price sealed-bid auction. The
objective function that each MNO tries to maximize is given
by:
Πi(bi,bj)=
[
rA(T1,T2)−bi
]·Ibi>bj
+
[
(1−αi)piB(T1,T2)−αi(rA(T1,T2)−bj)
]·Ibi<bj
(23)
where I is the indicator function, piB(T1, T2)=rB(T1, T2)−
cB − cBS is the MNO’s profit when leasing B, and αi∈ [0, 1]
is a parameter called the spite (or competition) coefficient.
As noted, MNO i is self-interested and only tries to max-
imize his own profit when αi=0. When αi=1, MNO i is
completely malicious and only attempts to obtain more market
share by forcing MNO j to lease the less-valued spectrum
block. For given αi∈[0,1] and αj∈[0,1], we can derive the
optimal bidding strategies that maximize the objective function
in Definition 3 as follows.
Proposition 3. In a first-price sealed-bid auction, the optimal
bidding strategy for a spiteful MNO i,j∈{1,2} and i6=j is:
b∗i =
(1+αi)r
A(T1,T2)−(1−αi)piB(T1,T2)+cA
2+αi
,
b∗j=
(1+αj)r
A(T1,T2)−(1−αj)piB(T1,T2)+cA
2+αj
. (24)
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that MNO i knows
his bid bi. Further, we assume that MNO i infer that the
bidding strategy of MNO j on A is drawn uniformly and in-
dependently from
[
cA,r
A(T1,T2)
]
. The MNO i’s optimization
problem is to choose bi to maximize the expectation of
Ebi(Πi)=
bi∫
cA
[
rA(T1,T2)−bi
]
f(bj)dbj
+
rA(T1,T2)∫
bi
[
(1−αi)(piB(T1,T2))−αi(rA(T1,T2)−bj)
]
f(bj)dbj .
(25)
Differentiating Equation (25) with respect to bi, setting the
result to zero and multiplying by r∗A−cA give
∂Ebi(Πi)
∂bi
= (1 + αi)r
A(T1, T2) − (1 − αi)piB(T1, T2)
+cA − (2 + αi)bi = 0.
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Fig. 6. Profit gain as a function of αi under two different costs (cA=1,
cA=2). Other parameters are uo=1, λ=0.01, η=0.6, T1=1, T2=10,
cB=1, and cBS=1.
Since the same analysis can be applied to the MNO j, the
proof is complete. 
Proposition 3 states that the MNOs’ equilibrium bidding
strategies. Intuitively, the more spiteful the MNO is, the more
aggressively the MNO tends to bid. For consistency, we
assume that αi > αj . Then we can now calculate MNO i’s
profit and MNO j’s profit as follows
pi∗i =
rA(T1,T2)−(1−αi)piB(T1,T2)+cA
2+αi
, pi∗j =pi
B(T1,T2),
(26)
where pi∗i is calculated by substraction of the bidding price b
∗
i
of (24) from rA(T1,T2) of (19).
To get some insight into the properties of the MNOs’
equilibrium profits, let us define ρgain=
pi∗i
pi∗j
2, which can be in-
terpreted as the profit gain from A relative B. When ρgain>1,
the profit of MNO i is higher than that of MNO j. It implies
that MNO i could gain a competitive advantage over MNO
j in both market share and profit. When ρ<1, the situation
is reversed. MNO j could take the lead in the profit despite
losing some market share to MNO i.
If the role of the government is to ensure fairness in two
MNOs’ profits, the government may devise two different
schemes: setting appropriate reserve prices and imposing lim-
its on the timing of the double-speed LTE services. According
2The gain ρgain is different from rgain of (19) where rgain(T1,T2) is
the revenue gain from A relative to B without considering any cost.
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to the Ofcom report, setting the reserve prices closer to market
value might be appropriate [17]. It indicates that the govern-
ment set cA and cB by estimating the value asymmetries be-
tween spectrum blocks A and B (i.e., rA(T1,T2)−rB(T1,T2))
and the spite coefficient αi. Fig. 6 shows the profit gain as
a function of αi under two different reserve prices for A
(i.e., cA=1, cA=2). For example, if αi=0.5, the government
should set the reserve prices cA=2, cB=1. On the other hand,
the government should set the reserve prices cA=1, cB=1
when αi=0.85.
Besides setting appropriate reserve prices, the government
can impose limits on the timing of the double-speed LTE
service. In South Korea, for instance, Korea Telecom (KT)
who acquired the continuous spectrum spectrum is allowed
to start its double-speed LTE service on metropolitan areas
immediately in September 2013, other major cities staring next
March, and nation-wide coverage starting next July [18]. This
scheme implies to reduces T1 by limiting the timing of the
double-speed LTE service to the MNO who acquires spectrum
block A. Fig. 7 shows the profit gain as a function of T1 under
two different spite coefficients (i.e., αi=0.6, αi=0.8).
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study bidding and pricing competition
between two spiteful MNOs with considering their existing
spectrum holdings. We develop an analytical framework to
investigate the interactions between two MNOs and users as
a three-stage dynamic game. Using backward induction, we
characterize the dynamic game’s equilibria. From this, we
show the asymmetric pricing structure and different market
share between two MNO. Perhaps counter-intuitively, our
results show that the MNO who acquires the less-valued
spectrum block always lowers his price despite providing
double-speed LTE service to users. We also show that the
MNO who acquires the high-valued spectrum block, despite
charging a higher price, still achieves more market share than
the other MNO. We further show that the competition between
two MNOs leads to some loss of their revenues. With the
example of South Korea, we investigate the cross-over point
at which two MNOs’ profits are switched, which serves as the
benchmark of practical auction designs.
Results of this paper can be extended in several directions.
Extending this work, it would be useful to propose some
methodologies for setting reserve prices [19], [20]. Second,
we could consider an oligopoly market where multiple MNOs
initially have different market share before spectrum alloca-
tion, where our current research is heading.
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